Half a Bubble Off Plumb!

In my “Happy Anniversary!” post of November 23, I wrote:

“From my point of view, the Exchange has tilted significantly toward the Seller community as it has attempted to bring on sufficient product to meet its volume targets.”

The degree of tilt is probably more than just “half a bubble”.

What has the Exchange done to “tilt” the playing field to favor the Sellers?

First let’s review where we began. From inception TRE:

--Has not required personal guarantees from the principals of Sellers,

--Has filed UCC Financing Statements encumbering ONLY the receivables sold on TRE (as opposed to getting a blanket lien on all receivables), and

--Has accepted internally-generated financial statements, frequently without any evidence of independent review.

Since the Exchange’s operations began, there have been a number of changes in policy or process that are good for Sellers but bad for Buyers.

What are some of those changes?

--Initially, invoices were to be verified by a third-party service provider. Now, the Exchange itself handles verification.

--Initially, the verification process was to include confirmation that goods had been delivered or services performed to the Account Debtor’s satisfaction. Now, verification is limited to obtaining confirmation that there is an invoice in the Debtor’s accounts payable system that matches the number, date and amount of the posted invoice. No actual affirmation of satisfaction is obtained. (Note that invoices from members of The Ariba Network do meet a more stringent standard.)

--Initially, all invoices were to be verified. Now, there is a sampling system.

--Initially, progress billings, which are common in the construction industry but present unusual risks, did not qualify for posting on the Exchange. That prohibition appears to have been relaxed.

These are significant procedural changes and they clearly increase the level of risk borne by Buyers on the Exchange.

I think it is clear that the changes have been made to allow TRE to attract more Sellers.

It might seem counter-intuitive that relaxation of procedural safeguards has been necessary to attract Sellers in the economic environment of the Exchange’s first year. After all, the papers have been full of stories about how difficult it is for businesses to find financing. But I don’t think the message is ambiguous.

TRE needs to ramp up volume to reach a level that makes it economically viable and proves to its equity investors that it is a viable operating entity for the long haul.

If the problem were attracting Buyers, any procedural changes affecting Sellers would be in the direction of tightening standards and procedures; making the risk profile more attractive to Buyers.

Changes in standards and procedures that increase risk to Buyers seem clearly to signal that the imbalance is on the Seller side.

The TRE calculus seems to be (this is my speculation only) that the Buyers will tolerate the increased risk as long as the risk is “potential” rather than “experienced”. That is, there are no significant Seller defaults and subsequent losses to Buyers. The implicit hope is that the Exchange can somehow control matters in the short term, avoiding any serious risk-related problems until it reaches its equilibrium level of volume.

At that time, maybe the process of moving back toward a level playing field can begin. If that IS what’s going on it’s a delicate and potentially perilous process.

On the positive side, while TRE will not hit its publically-stated volume targets this year, the volume HAS been ramping up significantly over the past few months and if we were to annualize current levels, the Exchange would come close to its volume goals on a run-rate basis.

If TRE can make meaningful progress on some of the impressive and important Seller-attraction initiatives already in place; including alliances with The Ariba Network, The American Staffing Association and Smyth Solutions, it is possible that it can reach a volume level in 2010 that can sustain its operations.

As it is approaching that critical volume level, however, it’s going to need some luck. The single greatest risk that it faces, I believe, is a nasty default and a public squabble over losses.

The additional risk in the system is real and “half a bubble” of tilt toward Seller-leniency is probably all the system can tolerate. Ultimately things will have to move back toward balance.

In the meantime: see my posts entitled “Caveat Emptor”.